I feel like you're trapped in the same mismatch of meanings of "morality" that the original paper by Mastroianni and Gilbert gets wrapped up in, which is to use measures of criminality (and the punishment of criminality) as an indicator of what people *mean* by "morality" when they assert there has been a moral decline in their lives.
That's a problem in two respects. First, what is criminal and the relative severity of what is defined as criminal has varied a great deal over time and it varies also in relationship to different histories of statehood or political authority. M&G and you both hew towards this as a metric because, at least in Western history, there's relatively good records back to the early modern period that might permit some kind of quantitatively sound claim about declining criminality and declining arbitrariness and cruelty of punishment for criminality. But how do you fit societies that did not have incarceration or a separate apparatus of their political authority dedicated to defining and reacting to criminal behavior into this presumably universal assertion about the trendlines into modernity? Those societies often, rather reasonably, have tended to think that the advent of state authorities that concretize criminality and maintain judicial and carceral systems seems like a net *increase* in criminality and thus in immorality. In that sense, many smaller-scale southern African communities may have quite plausibly viewed the arrival of European colonial settlers and then later imperial administrations as a dramatic uptick in immorality. This is only one of a number of issues even if you just stick with criminality as a proxy for morality.
But the real problem is that when people talk about a perception of moral decline in contemporary societies (and for the last 50-75 years) they're often not talking about criminality per se, so waving crime data at them doesn't actually meaningfully engage with that discourse. (Additionally, though, perceptions about the frequency of crime don't tend to be affected much by the measured reality of crime in various kinds of data, but that's a different problem.) If you listen to the discourse of moral decline, it's often focused on one hand on issues of trust, reciprocity, mutual aid, closeness of social relationships, etc.; and on the other hand changes in predominant or visible sociocultural practices--how people dress, how they behave in sexual and intimate relationships, how they perform respect between generational groups or other social groups, what they read or listen to in the culture, whether they swear a great deal, whether they are religious or observe spiritual rituals, etc.
I think it's still accurate to suggest that the ubiquity of 'moral decline' as a concept across time and space suggests that there is a strong pull to think and feel that way that in independent from evidence or data--if nothing else, the life cycle inclines all of us to think that things are getting worse as we age because in a purely embodied sense, they undoubtedly are, and for most of us, at least some of what we hoped for about ourselves has also not coming to pass; the poison of regret is a strong reason to talk the language of moral decline. But I don't think you can dispel the illusion of moral decline by crime statistics--you're not meeting it where it lives.
I always enjoy this type of research. The ease of access to news and the wide coverage of it (i.e. from all corners of the world) obviously only fuels the negativity bias. A question that would be interesting to explore is whether this 'higher ethical standard' is a result of an innate improvement and evolution in consciousness (and thus, conscience) or because social structures and norms make it more difficult to act in evil and destructive ways. Of course, social norms reflect the level of consciousness in a society to some extent. But then the bigger question is whether things in general are getting better? There is no doubt that most environments are more polluted than in the past as a result of economic growth. And then there's the question of subjective wellbeing - depression, anxiety etc. are increasing (arguably, perhaps... may there is data like you outlined here which also sheds another light on this idea, for example that depression and anxiety are relatively new diagnostic constructs, and that people suffered other similar conditions that were just not identified and named) and its difficult to say whether there is greater psychological quality of life. Is there perhaps an inverse relationship between material prosperity and psychological 'prosperity'? Your article gives rise to so many more questions... wish I was still in university to debate them.
I feel like you're trapped in the same mismatch of meanings of "morality" that the original paper by Mastroianni and Gilbert gets wrapped up in, which is to use measures of criminality (and the punishment of criminality) as an indicator of what people *mean* by "morality" when they assert there has been a moral decline in their lives.
That's a problem in two respects. First, what is criminal and the relative severity of what is defined as criminal has varied a great deal over time and it varies also in relationship to different histories of statehood or political authority. M&G and you both hew towards this as a metric because, at least in Western history, there's relatively good records back to the early modern period that might permit some kind of quantitatively sound claim about declining criminality and declining arbitrariness and cruelty of punishment for criminality. But how do you fit societies that did not have incarceration or a separate apparatus of their political authority dedicated to defining and reacting to criminal behavior into this presumably universal assertion about the trendlines into modernity? Those societies often, rather reasonably, have tended to think that the advent of state authorities that concretize criminality and maintain judicial and carceral systems seems like a net *increase* in criminality and thus in immorality. In that sense, many smaller-scale southern African communities may have quite plausibly viewed the arrival of European colonial settlers and then later imperial administrations as a dramatic uptick in immorality. This is only one of a number of issues even if you just stick with criminality as a proxy for morality.
But the real problem is that when people talk about a perception of moral decline in contemporary societies (and for the last 50-75 years) they're often not talking about criminality per se, so waving crime data at them doesn't actually meaningfully engage with that discourse. (Additionally, though, perceptions about the frequency of crime don't tend to be affected much by the measured reality of crime in various kinds of data, but that's a different problem.) If you listen to the discourse of moral decline, it's often focused on one hand on issues of trust, reciprocity, mutual aid, closeness of social relationships, etc.; and on the other hand changes in predominant or visible sociocultural practices--how people dress, how they behave in sexual and intimate relationships, how they perform respect between generational groups or other social groups, what they read or listen to in the culture, whether they swear a great deal, whether they are religious or observe spiritual rituals, etc.
I think it's still accurate to suggest that the ubiquity of 'moral decline' as a concept across time and space suggests that there is a strong pull to think and feel that way that in independent from evidence or data--if nothing else, the life cycle inclines all of us to think that things are getting worse as we age because in a purely embodied sense, they undoubtedly are, and for most of us, at least some of what we hoped for about ourselves has also not coming to pass; the poison of regret is a strong reason to talk the language of moral decline. But I don't think you can dispel the illusion of moral decline by crime statistics--you're not meeting it where it lives.
I always enjoy this type of research. The ease of access to news and the wide coverage of it (i.e. from all corners of the world) obviously only fuels the negativity bias. A question that would be interesting to explore is whether this 'higher ethical standard' is a result of an innate improvement and evolution in consciousness (and thus, conscience) or because social structures and norms make it more difficult to act in evil and destructive ways. Of course, social norms reflect the level of consciousness in a society to some extent. But then the bigger question is whether things in general are getting better? There is no doubt that most environments are more polluted than in the past as a result of economic growth. And then there's the question of subjective wellbeing - depression, anxiety etc. are increasing (arguably, perhaps... may there is data like you outlined here which also sheds another light on this idea, for example that depression and anxiety are relatively new diagnostic constructs, and that people suffered other similar conditions that were just not identified and named) and its difficult to say whether there is greater psychological quality of life. Is there perhaps an inverse relationship between material prosperity and psychological 'prosperity'? Your article gives rise to so many more questions... wish I was still in university to debate them.