Rebels with a cause

GUEST POST: Lessons from a society that accepts rebellion

For Colombians, peace processes are a regular occurrence. So much so that each of us could chronicle our lives based on these processes. In my case, for example, I have seen more than ten large-scale peace negotiations, each of which was described, at the time, as the definitive solution to violence in the country.

And we could go back much further than the 1990s. The tradition of dialogue-based conflict resolution in Colombia has a long history. In a recent working paper, together with Leopoldo Fergusson of the University of Los Andes, and James Robinson and Santiago Torres of the University of Chicago, we showed that since the Rionegro Constitution of 1863, there have been legal tools to facilitate peaceful resolutions to internal conflicts in Colombia.

In the 1863 constitution, Colombians introduced the ‘derecho de gentes’ for the first time – a principle used to manage internal conflict. Derecho de gentes allowed the state to treat rebels – those who rose up in arms against the state – as political enemies and not as criminals. This opened the door to systematically offer everything that entails a peace agreement – things like pardons and political privileges.

This was an atypical solution. Most societies in modern history have generated essentially punitive solutions to confront rebellion. For example, in the U.S. constitutional convention in Philadelphia, a place where discussions very similar to those in Rionegro took place, it was decided that the penalty for rising in arms against the state should be death.

The Rionegro Constitution was radical in many ways. The vast majority of elements it introduced were left behind with the conservative constitution of 1886 and the countless subsequent constitutional reforms. Nevertheless, the ‘kindness’ toward rebels persisted. A simple way to see it is to note that the penal code of 1980, which governed until 2000, stipulating a penalty of less than 6 years in prison for acts of rebellion – something very similar to the penalty of the Rionegro Constitution. The penalty for rebellion had largely remained the same for more than a century even though penalties for other crimes, such as homicide, had not stopped increasing since the mid-19th century (see image below).

Drawing parallels with the South African experience, it becomes evident that historical acceptance of rebellion has significantly shaped the trajectory of conflict resolution. Similar to Colombia, South Africa has a history marked by protracted struggles, notably against apartheid. The negotiations and peace processes that led to the end of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic South Africa were emblematic of the acceptance of former rebels as political actors. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) further exemplifies this approach, offering amnesty to individuals who confessed to politically motivated crimes. This acknowledgement of the political nature of the struggle, rather than a purely criminal one, echoes the historical acceptance of rebellion present in Colombia.

The concept of legal tools for peaceful resolution, as seen in Colombia’s Rionegro Constitution, also finds resonance in South Africa’s post-apartheid era. Negotiating and drafting a new constitution in the early 1990s were pivotal in the country’s transition to democracy. The constitutional framework facilitated the inclusion of former rebels and political dissidents within the political process, providing a legal and institutional basis for reconciliation. The South African experience demonstrates that establishing political participation mechanisms and recognising past grievances can contribute to a more sustainable and inclusive peace.

However, the long-term consequences of accepting rebellion in Colombia should also be a warning sign for South Africans. Even if one is skeptical about the role of incentives in criminal behaviour and believes that higher penalties do not deter someone from committing a crime, it is clear that an environment where violent threats to the state are accepted is one in which the illegitimacy of that state is recognised from the outset. And building a stable and peaceful society in the context of state illegitimacy is tremendously complicated. Taking this into account, it is not surprising that Colombia became one of the most violent countries in the Western Hemisphere.

This opinion does not imply minimizing the role of many other factors that have fueled the conflict in Colombia – as well as in South Africa. If inequality in Colombia were minimal, drug trafficking would never have arrived, and if we had a geography that hindered the operations of guerrilla groups, the armed conflict would possibly have been exhausted decades ago.

Nor does it mean that dialogue is not the main tool for peaceful coexistence. Living in society is difficult. We are all different and want different things for our society. Discussing those differences and reaching agreements is the very essence of democracy.

In fact, we abandon these principles when building a social contract in which it is accepted that some use violence to achieve their goals, when we expect the rest of society to subsequently offer them favours to persuade them to choose peaceful paths. What is clear from the Colombian example is that embracing violence as a tool in politics undermines democracy, inviting a cycle of endless conflict.

‘Rebels with a cause’ was first published on Our Long Walk. Support more such writing by signing up for a paid subscription. The image was created with Midjourney v6. Prompt: Combining Fernando Botero and Nelson Makamo’s painting styles, rotund figures gather under a lush, oversized Colombian tree, signing peace agreements between government officials and rebel fighters.