The surprising success of Dutch politician Geert Wilders in the recent elections shows how Europe is increasingly shifting to the right on the political spectrum.
One reason for his success is his focus on immigration. Just look at how Wilders' popularity increased rapidly after October 7, the day Hamas invaded Israel. His message was unequivocal: immigration, especially from Muslim countries, must be stopped. It’s time ‘for the Netherlands to be Dutch again’.
But Wilders is not an outlier. Across Europe, we see the rise of what Tyler Cowen calls a New Right-wing political ideology. Just look at the success of similar parties in Austria, Germany, France, Italy, or the anti-immigrant uprisings in typically peaceful places like Sweden or, just a few weeks ago, in Ireland.
What explains these anti-immigration preferences? There are many causes, of course, but in my opinion, the core is economic. It starts with Europe’s demographic challenges: the ratio of older to younger Europeans is getting larger. This means the pool of working taxpayers who must support this welfare state is getting smaller. One way to address this is immigration, and at least since the 1990s, with the formation of the European Union, open borders have been seen as necessary to keep the economy growing.
It was especially the political and economic elites who advocated this classic liberal view of immigration. But the speed and scale at which it happened began to change the national identity of many European countries. For many Dutch, French, and British people, this changing identity was accompanied by a threat to their national sovereignty and security. Here it helps to think of what I call the ‘Impossible Trinity of Immigration’. I steal the idea from what economists call the Mundell-Fleming model, which says you can always have only two of exchange rate stability, independent monetary policy, and capital mobility, but never all three simultaneously. Ditto for Open Borders, National Identity, and Welfare State Sustainability. You can choose any two, but not all three.
At least since the 1990s, most Western democracies have chosen a combination of Open Borders and Welfare State Sustainability, reflecting a cosmopolitan outlook and a commitment to social support systems. This approach has emphasised the benefits of globalisation and integration, with the assumption that a generous welfare state can manage the challenges of assimilating immigrants.
But the welfare state was not geared for the scale at which immigration, especially since the 2010s, increased. Given the large cultural differences of many immigrants, assimilation was also not as easy as the elites believed it would be. But it was especially the economic competition for blue-collar jobs that explains the rise of the New Right. Just look at Wilders’ supporters in the Netherlands, mostly those without university education who must directly compete with immigrants. National Identity has now replaced Open Borders in the trinity.
We in South Africa have seen this story before. After South Africa left the gold standard in 1932, economic growth exploded – in some years, it was even above 10%. Mining production was responsible for most of this growth, but manufacturing also became an increasingly larger part of the economy. The war years naturally benefited South Africa; we manufactured products for the war-torn European markets. But with many white men fighting, some of these economic benefits went to previously marginalised groups, such as white women and black men. Black urbanisation was increasing, especially to the mines and factories around Johannesburg. When the soldiers returned and realised women and black workers were now performing their jobs, and typically at a much lower salary, their privileged position (and status) was threatened and they made their voices heard at the polls.
In the 1940s, there was widespread optimism among black South Africans that their increasing economic freedoms would lead to political freedom. But after the 1948 election, the exact opposite happened, with tragic consequences. Black South Africans were treated as immigrants in ‘white South Africa’, and apartheid South Africa indeed chose National Identity and a (white) Welfare State at the expense of Open Borders.
The irony was that the South African economy of the 1950s and 60s began to falter from the tremendous shortage of especially skilled workers. Bantu education, group area laws, and the colour bar prevented black workers from being trained and filling skilled positions. Companies would increasingly mechanise in the 1970s, precisely to address the shortage of workers. This was the origin of South Africa’s enormous unemployment problem.
Likewise, Europe will need more and more immigrants as its population ages. But with the popularity of the New Right – a choice for National Identity and a Welfare State over Open Borders – immigrants will be less and less of a solution to the demographic problem. This will put more and more pressure on young people to face the economic challenges.
One would think that young people are therefore in favour of immigration. But this is another lesson to learn from 1948: following a wave of Afrikaner nationalism, it was especially young people, and not necessarily just conservative elders, who voted for apartheid. (For example, the later president PW Botha was 32 when he became an MP in 1948.) Similarly, the youth of Europe are increasingly moving towards the New Right. Just look at the results of the scholierenverkiezingen (student elections) a few days before the official election in the Netherlands, in which a record number of students participated. Wilders’ party was first, and the Forum for Democracy, another right-wing populist party, second.
The shift to the Right is therefore not just a short-term trend, along with their anti-immigration sentiments. But just like in apartheid South Africa, this will create long-term economic challenges for Europe. This is most clearly seen in Japan, another country that prefers National Identity and a Welfare State over Open Borders. Japan’s population will have 50 million fewer people 2070 than it has today, with 40% of people over the age of 65. There simply aren’t enough young people to sustain the welfare state.
Perhaps technology is the solution to everything. Artificial intelligence might replace worker intelligence, thus reducing labour demand. Japan is already building robots to care for the elderly, clean hotels, or provide companionship to young men. Will we see tulip-selling robots in Amsterdam in the not-too-distant future?
Hoping technology can solve the shortage of future workers (and taxpayers) is a big gamble. What is clear is that voters in Europe trust open borders even less.
An edited version of this post appeared (in Afrikaans) in Rapport on 10 December 2023. The image was created using Midjourney v5.2.
Your article was good timing as I watched this, about Sweden, less than an hour ago - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwWMjxLrmVE
Yesterday, Germany was notable - https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-far-right-afd-can-be-put-under-surveillance/a-61058359